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Abstract: We employ a computable general equilibrium approach to examine the effects of 
alternative food aid distribution schemes for drought-response food aid to Mozambique. 
Alternative schemes have very distinct impacts on household welfare and prices. Compared with 
monetization of food aid by government, direct distribution to households (by population shares) 
strongly benefits rural households. Even assuming that government cannot target food aid strictly 
at drought-stricken rural people, our results indicate that, when improving household welfare is 
the primary goal of the food aid, direct distribution of food aid to households is preferred. 
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Who Gets the Goods? 
A General Equilibrium Perspective on Food Aid in Mozambique 
 
1. Introduction 
Even though food aid (surveyed by Maxwell and Singer, 1979) has progressively declined 
as a share of total official development assistance from over 15% in the early 1970s to less than 
5% in the 1990s, food aid has always been a controversial form of aid. It has generated debate, 
and volumes have been written. Much of this literature focuses on the political economy of food 
aid and whether food aid is "additional" (e.g., Colding and Pinstrup-Andersen, 1999; Ruttan, 
1993); the impacts of food aid on agricultural production in the recipient country (e.g., Barrett, 
1998; Isenman and Singer, 1993); and the real cost of food aid relative to other forms of 
development assistance (e.g., Clay, Dhiri, and Benson, 1996). A second strand of literature 
examines monetization-- whether food aid, particularly project or emergency, should be sold or 
distributed to consumers directly (e.g., Dorosh and Haggblade, 1997; Maxwell and Templer, 
1994; Reutlinger, 1984).  
Questions regarding the impact of food aid are typically, and appropriately, posed and 
analyzed in a partial equilibrium context. Nevertheless, general equilibrium effects of food aid 
are widely acknowledged to exist and to be important. The analytics of food aid in general 
equilibrium have, for example, been traced out by Bhagwati (1985). However, despite vastly 
increased capacity to conduct applied or computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis in 
recent years, relatively little CGE analysis has been conducted on food aid issues. The CGE 
analyses conducted to date have generally focused on assessment of food aid needs (Riaz, 1992; 
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Sadoulet and de Janry, 1992). The present article seeks to contribute to the debate regarding 
monetization of food aid using a general equilibrium approach. Specifically, the general 
equilibrium effects of alternative distribution schemes for food aid following a drought are 
examined for the case of Mozambique. We find that different distribution schemes (e.g., who 
takes possession of the food for either direct consumption or resale) have very distinct general 
equilibrium effects. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as followed. Section 2 provides background on 
food aid to Mozambique. Section 3 presents the CGE model employed with special attention to 
unique features of the model and the treatment of food aid. Section 4 discusses simulations and 
results. A final section concludes. 
2. Background on Mozambique 
The population of Mozambique is predominantly rural and overwhelmingly poor. Analysis 
of data from the 1996-97 marketing year (a good production year) revealed that 64% of the rural 
population had insufficient calories available to meet the requirements of household members 
(MPF/UEM/IFPRI, 1998). Primary agriculture accounts for about 25% of gross domestic product 
(GDP) (NIS, 1998), rural households are heavily dependent on agriculture for income (Benfica, 
1998), and home consumption of own agricultural production accounts for 40% of total 
expenditure by rural households (Arndt, Jensen, Robinson, and Tarp, 2000). In addition, climate 
induced variability in agricultural production can be large (Rojas and Amade, 1997).  
In this environment, the economic impacts of drought can be substantial; and food aid can 
play a significant role in palliating the negative effects of drought. To give an extreme example, 
due to the combined effects of war and drought, the Mozambican population essentially subsisted 
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on food aid in 1992 (Tschirley, Donovan, and Weber, 1996). Since that time, the return of peace 
and good rains have helped to dramatically increase agricultural production and reduce food 
imports. Trends in production and imports of maize are shown in Figure 1. Import data are not 
yet available for 1998 and 1999. However, the Southern African Development Community Food 
Security Unit projects a mild maize surplus for the 1999-2000 marketing year. Food aid volumes 
have declined commensurately with the increases in production and decreases in imports.1  
While one certainly hopes that the desperate situation encountered in 1992 will not return, 
drought is almost certain to strike again in the relatively near future. Following a widespread and 
reasonably severe drought, food imports will reappear on a large scale. It is also reasonable to 
expect that a substantial share of these imports will arrive in the form of food aid. 
3. The CGE Model 
In many ways, the model employed for this analysis is quite standard. Excellent 
descriptions of standard neoclassical CGE models are available in Dervis, de Melo, and 
Robinson (1982) and Devarajan, Go, Lewis, Robinson, and Sinko (1997). However, the 
Mozambique model exhibits a number of important departures from standard neoclassical CGE 
models. These departures, plus a brief description of other model characteristics, are in focus in 
this section. The full set of model equations is available upon request. 
Marketing Margins 
                                                 
1Mozambique remains a structural importer of wheat and rice. These imports represent 
about 15% of total domestic supply of cereals (SADC/FSU, 1999). 
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Margins between the price paid at the source of supply, such as the farm gate, and the price 
paid by the final consumer are often very large. High marketing costs reflect: large distances 
between production and consumption centers, poor infrastructure, high costs of capital which 
result in high costs of holding inventories, and high risks associated with trading activities 
combined with limited opportunities for diversification. They are particularly large in primary 
agriculture and primary agricultural processing. In the 1995 social accounting matrix on which 
the CGE model is based, these two sectors account for 70% of total spending on margin services. 
In the model, marketing margins are carefully accounted for. In addition, marketing margin rates 
vary depending upon whether the product is produced and sold domestically, exported, or 
imported. These margins are discussed in more detail in Arndt, Jensen, Robinson, and Tarp 
(2000). 
Home consumption  
The presence of high marketing margins implies a significant wedge between the 
factory/farm gate sales price and the purchase price for consumption of a given commodity. 
Rather than sell at a low price and purchase at a high price, households, particularly rural 
agricultural households, can opt to consume at least some of what they produce. In this manner, 
marketing margins are avoided.  
Home and marketed consumption of all commodities is captured in a linear expenditure 
system (LES) formulation. Home and marketed commodities are treated as separate commodities 
in the system. So, for example, home consumed cassava differs from marketed cassava. In this 
formulation, supernumerary income, defined as household income less savings, taxes, and the 
cost of minimum consumption levels of both home and marketed commodities, is allocated 
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across commodities via share parameters. Elasticities of substitution between home and marketed 
commodities are determined by minimum consumption parameters. If these minimum 
consumption parameters are set to zero, the LES formulation collapses to a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function with elasticities of substitution equal to one. 
The parameters of the utility function (estimation described in Arndt, Robinson, and Tarp, 
1999), set the quantity of home consumption to be relatively insensitive to changes in price 
through relatively high values on the minimum consumption parameters, especially for rural 
households. This implies that marketed production of agricultural commodities will tend to be 
more variable than total production volume as rural households will sell more surplus in good  
years and retain a greater share of harvest to meet family needs in poor years. 
While large marketing margins and high shares of home consumption are common features 
of African economies, this is to the authors’ knowledge the first CGE model of an African 
economy that simultaneously captures these features. 
Food Aid 
Food aid enters the model through the composite commodity market clearing conditions. It 
simply increases composite commodity supply. While the machinery of the model would allow 
for increased supply of any commodity in the model through food aid, food aid in Mozambique 
has almost invariably arrived in the form of grains. Food aid is thus modeled as an increase in the 
supply of grains.  
Under this formulation, food aid represents an increase in the supply of goods without any 
associated real resource costs of production or delivery. As such, the model takes the perspective 
of the recipient who simply receives an increased supply of food (in the form of grain). This 
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formulation is attractive in that it is simple and conforms to the basic vision of the purpose of 
food aid. A potential disadvantage of the formulation is that marketing margins are avoided. As 
emphasized above, receipt and distribution of goods, such as grains, entails real resource costs. 
The model does not capture any real resource costs associated with receipt and distribution of 
food aid.  
While imperfect, this approach is probably the best available option. Domestic real 
resource costs associated with receipt and distribution of food aid are not known. They are likely 
to be considerably below the domestic real resource marketing cost for locally produced or 
privately imported products for two reasons. First, food aid distributors tap international credit 
markets and do not have commercial motivations. As a result, the costs of working capital and 
risk considerations, both of which are mentioned above as major contributors to the marketing 
margins, do not apply. Second, distribution infrastructure, such as trucks, often arrives with the 
food aid allowing (all too frequently according to critics) food aid providers to sidestep local 
marketing services (Colding and Pinstrup-Andersen, 2000).2 These considerations, combined 
with the advantages of simplicity, make the current formulation attractive. 
Once the food aid enters the system, careful consideration is given to who takes ownership. 
The food aid is valued at market prices. If, for example, the government takes ownership of the 
food aid, it can sell the food aid and use the resulting revenue in any manner it chooses.3 If, on 
                                                 
2Note that we are not arguing that it is cheaper or better, from the donor perspective, to 
sidestep local credit and distribution channels. We are merely stating that it is done. An extreme 
example is the airlifting of grain to drought struck regions. From the donor perspective, this 
operation is very expensive. From the recipient perspective, grain simply appears in the region 
with practically no domestic resource costs associated with receipt and distribution. 
3Donors may of course decide to play a role here, but we assume that this does not change 
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the other hand, the food aid is distributed directly to households, it can either be consumed 
directly or sold in order to purchase other goods.  
                                                                                                                                                             
in any way the use of the revenue. This seems reasonable in view of past experience. 
Other Features Plus Parameter Estimation and Model Validation 
Two types of labor, agricultural and non-agricultural, are present in the model. Due to the 
short run nature of the simulations, capital is fixed in each sector; and agricultural labor is fixed 
by agricultural activity. For agricultural activities, this amounts to assuming that a production 
plan is decided upon prior to the onset of drought. Once the drought begins, agents in the 
agricultural sector, particularly the smallholders who dominate production, have very little 
opportunity to react. Production technology is Cobb-Douglas in value added. This value added 
aggregate combines with intermediate products in a Leontief fashion. The model contains a rural 
and an urban household. The rural household gains income primarily from sale of agricultural 
labor while the urban household gains income primarily from sale of non-agricultural labor and 
capital rental. The consumer price index, inclusive of the prices of home consumed goods, is the 
numeraire. Government recurrent and investment spending is set at a constant share of absorption 
(except when revenue from food aid sales accrues to the government). The model is closed by 
fixing the value of foreign currency inflows and allowing the exchange rate to adjust 
endogenously. This closure is the most logical due to the importance of aid flows. 
Base data for the model is derived from a 1995 social accounting matrix (SAM) for 
Mozambique (Arndt, Cruz, Jensen, Robinson, and Tarp, 1998). The SAM contains detailed 
primary agriculture, primary agriculture processing, and marketing cost accounts. Simulations are 
conducted on a slightly aggregated SAM containing 10 primary product activities, three primary 
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agriculture processing activities, five industrial activities, and 10 service activities. Excepting the 
commerce activity, to which there is no corresponding commodity, activities and commodities 
correspond one to one. 
A novel maximum entropy approach was employed to validate the model and to estimate 
behavioral parameters (Arndt, Robinson, and Tarp, 1999). Briefly, the full CGE model was 
backcasted to follow the historical record for the period 1996 to 1992 (five observations). Import 
(CES) and export (CET) parameters, LES preference parameters, and technical change 
parameters were chosen which permitted the model to best reproduce the historical record 
conditional on a set of prior distributions for these parameters. Measures of goodness of fit 
indicated that the model is capable of reproducing many of the salient aspects of recent economic 
history in Mozambique.  
In order to reduce computational burden, a fairly aggregate version of the model was 
employed in the estimation/validation procedure. In parameterizing the more disaggregate model 
employed here, the parameter value estimated for an aggregate is assigned to all of its 
components. For example, an Armington import elasticity was estimated for the aggregate food 
crops. Commodities in this aggregation such as grains and other basic food crops are therefore all 
assumed to have the same import elasticity in the simulations conducted here. 
4. Simulations and Results 
Table 1 lists the simulations presented. Experiment 1 simulates a drought in the absence of 
any food aid for drought relief. Experiment 2 combines drought with food aid. Food aid volumes 
amount to nearly 60% of the volume of grain imports observed in experiment 1 or 85% of the 
volume of grain imports observed in 1995, the base year for the SAM. The food aid imports are 
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monetized at market prices and the revenue is delivered to government. Government is assumed 
to spend the food aid revenue on recurrent and investment expenditure in accordance with 
observed spending shares.4 Experiment 3 is the same as experiment 2 except that the food aid is 
delivered directly to rural and urban households according to population shares.5 
In simulating drought in Mozambique, it is worthwhile to note that agricultural production 
is essentially the process of converting labor into agricultural goods. The vast majority of 
production is smallholder based using rudimentary technology. Input use is essentially confined 
to seed, capital involves rudimentary tools only, and land is generally abundant.6 In this 
environment, drought can be adequately simulated by shocking technology in a Hicks-neutral 
fashion. The exact declines in technology are listed in Table 2. Since labor and capital are fixed 
by agricultural activity, the technology declines shown in Table 2 translate directly into 
production declines.7 
                                                 
4Other spending schemes are, of course, possible. Note that, monetization by government 
with the proceeds distributed to households is, in this model, tantamount to direct distribution to 
households. 
5The simulations assume a 70% rural and 30% urban population split in accordance with 
the 1997 population census. 
6There is evidence of land scarcity in some areas (MAP/MSU, 1992). 
7The cotton sector receives some special treatment. National accounts data indicate that 
raw cotton is neither exported nor imported. The textile industry relies entirely on domestically 
produced cotton. As a result, demand for domestically produced cotton is extremely inelastic and 
changes in production result in substantial price movements. Perhaps because of this issue, 
textile firms have been granted monopsony power in purchasing raw cotton in predetermined 
"action zones". These monopsonies are regulated (and partially owned) by the government. 
Prices for raw cotton are contracted in advance of the growing season. To reflect this 
environment, we assume that the producer price of cotton is fixed (relative to the CPI), and that 
textile firms maintain a stock of raw cotton in order to smooth out variability in production. 
The figures in Table 2 reflect existing time series data on production as analyzed by Bacou 
(2000), the technology parameters estimated by Arndt, Robinson, and Tarp (1999) for agriculture 
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in 1992 (a severe drought year) from their backcasting work, interviews with experts on 
Mozambican agriculture, and the judgement of the authors. The figures in Table 2 represent a 
weighted average agricultural productivity decline of 20%. 
Table 3 illustrates the macroeconomic effects of the shocks. As expected, the drought 
results in a decline in GDP in all scenarios. In experiment 1 (no food aid), a steep decline in 
home consumption, a more moderate decline in marketed consumption, and an increase in 
imports contribute to the decline in GDP. In order to finance the increased imports (primarily of 
food), exports must increase. This is possible since primary agriculture and processed food 
account for less than 15% of total exports (fish and services comprise the bulk of exports). Due 
to a sizeable trade deficit, the proportionate rise in exports must exceed the rise in imports in 
order to maintain external balance. Note that, in experiment 2 where government receives 
revenue from monetized, the share of government in GDP expands. 
Recall that the agricultural share in GDP is about 25% and that the decline in agricultural 
productivity is about 20%. This implies a GDP decline of about 5%, which is the GDP decline 
generated by the model. Production in non-agricultural sectors changes relatively little with 
export oriented tending to expand slightly. This lack of spillover of drought induced GDP decline 
into non-agricultural sectors is consistent with the work of Benson and Clay (1998) who find, in 
a cross country analysis focused on Africa, that the GDP effects of drought in countries with 
relatively low levels of development, such as Mozambique, tend to be confined to the 
agricultural sector due to relatively weak links between primary agriculture and non-agricultural 
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sectors in the input/output matrix. As a result, the drought induced decline in agriculture is 
relatively isolated and does not spill over into other sectors.8  
The consumer price index is held fixed at a constant level in the simulations (it is the 
numeraire). Consequently, the absorption figures presented at the bottom of Table 3 can be used 
as a measure of aggregate welfare. As expected, the addition of food aid does not change GDP 
substantially (the small change observed is due to changes in output composition). However, 
food aid does increase welfare as measured by nominal absorption deflated by the consumer 
price index. Based on this measure alone, monetized food aid (experiment 2) is preferred as it 
results in the smallest drought induced decline in absorption/welfare. However, investment and 
government spending are significant components of absorption; and the focus in drought years is 
on household consumption.  
                                                 
8The existence of raw cotton stocks also attenuates the connection between agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors. 
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Table 4 shows equivalent variation (EV) on consumption for urban and rural households 
for the three experiments. By this measure, the ranking is reversed. Household welfare, as 
measured by equivalent variation on consumption, is substantially higher when food aid is 
distributed directly to households (experiment 3) as opposed to monetized by government 
(experiment 2). The differential effects of alternative food aid distribution schemes on the 
components of total absorption drive this result on aggregate household welfare. When food aid 
is distributed to households, the first order incidence of the food aid accrues directly to 
households and the household share of total absorption expands with concomitant impacts on 
household welfare.9  
In order to explain the differences in welfare results between households (as well as the 
differences in the impacts on aggregate absorption across experiments), grain import volumes 
and relative price effects must be examined. Grain import volumes are shown in Table 5. Note 
that food aid primarily substitutes for commercial imports. The total supply of grain available 
(domestic production, plus imports, plus food aid) varies, but not dramatically, across the 
experiments. 
The changes in agricultural terms of trade, using the price of value added in agriculture 
relative to non-agriculture, are depicted in Table 6. Following a drought (experiment 1), 
agricultural terms of trade increase dramatically reflecting the contraction of agricultural 
production. Large budget shares for food, especially home consumption, imply that rural 
household welfare decreases despite the improved terms of trade in the sale of their agricultural 
                                                 
9Ordinarily, one strives to prevent shifts in the composition of absorption from 
contaminating welfare analysis. However, in this short run analysis of the implications of drought 
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production. Urban household welfare declines primarily due to higher prices for agricultural 
products. 
                                                                                                                                                             
and food aid, these compositional shifts are in focus. 
When food aid in the form of grains appears as in experiment 2, the effect is to diminish 
the agricultural terms of trade relative to experiment 1. The producer price of grains, which rises 
by 28% in experiment 1, but only by 16% in experiment 2, is the main reason for the more 
modest increase in the agricultural terms of trade. Prices of other agricultural products rise very 
slightly between experiments 1 and 2. Due to these price shifts, the benefits of food aid tend to 
accrue to urban households (Table 4). In sharp contrast, when food aid is distributed directly to 
households, agricultural terms of trade actually increase. The difference in impact on agricultural 
terms of trade between experiments 2 and 3 is very substantial.  
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The differential impact on agricultural terms of trade between experiments 2 and 3 arises 
from the very different marginal budget shares between households and government. Urban and 
rural households spend respectively 64% and 88% of an additional unit of income directed to 
consumption (e.g., an increment to supernumerary income) on primary agricultural commodities 
and processed foods. On the other hand, only 5% of government spending on commodities is 
directed towards primary agricultural commodities and processed foods. By assumption, 
marginal and average government budget shares are equated in the model formulation. 
Consequently, the first order impact of monetized food aid with the revenue given to government 
is an increase in spending on non-agricultural goods. The opposite occurs when food aid is given 
directly to households. The income increases resulting from food aid are directed 
overwhelmingly towards agricultural goods. These differential spending patterns affect the 
desired composition of total absorption and strongly influence relative prices.10 
                                                 
10The difference in price effects between experiments 2 and 3 also help to explain the 
difference in effects on absorption observed in Table 3. Absorption in Table 3 is deflated by the 
CPI. The CPI is composed primarily of food. If the CPI were not the numeraire, it would have a 
higher value in experiment 3 compared with experiment 2. Since the CPI is the numeraire, other 
prices must decline. This change in prices relative to the CPI explains the greater decline in 
absorption in experiment 3 compared with experiment 2.  
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The effects of these differentials in spending patterns can also be seen in the figures on 
grain import volumes shown in Table 5. In the absence of food aid, drought drives up grain 
import volumes by nearly 50% relative to the base. When food aid is delivered and monetized 
with the proceeds accruing to government as in experiment 2, the income/welfare impacts on the 
primary demanders of grain, households (particularly rural households), are relatively small. As a 
result, grain demand is essentially constant and food aid mainly serves to displace imports. Total 
grain import volume remains essentially the same (commercial imports plus food aid).11 When 
the food aid is delivered to households as in experiment 3, household income/welfare expands 
and demand for grain expands along with it. Imports of grain in experiment 3 are 5% greater than 
in experiment 1.12 The increase comes through the food aid transfer induced income expansion 
which stimulates household demand. In the real world, targeting of food aid distributions to 
particularly hard hit members of the population, where effective demand is lowest, would likely 
result in a larger increase in food supply relative to a no food aid scenario (e.g., further reductions 
in import displacement). 
                                                 
11Since food aid enters as composite commodity and imports must combine with domestic 
production in order to form the composite commodity, we are technically adding together 
different products or adding together apples and oranges. A more apt analogy would be adding 
together white and yellow maize, which does, in fact, give a good idea of total maize availability. 
Nevertheless, despite the relatively high Arminton elasticity, this product differentiation between 
imported and domestic grains drives the relative price shifts observed for grains between 
experiments 1 and 2. 
12Imports of other food commodities also increase. 
Table 7 illustrates the impacts on factor prices. These results follow logically from the 
preceding discussion. Drought (experiment 1) reduces returns to all factors relative to the CPI. 
Due to the improvements in agricultural terms of trade, agricultural labor experiences the mildest 
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factor price decline relative to other factors. When food aid is monetized and the proceeds spent 
by government (experiment 2), the drought induced agricultural terms of trade improvement is 
moderated. As a result, returns to agricultural labor decline and returns to non-agricultural labor 
and capital increase relative to experiment 1. When food aid is delivered directly to households 
in experiment 3, the improvements in agricultural terms of trade, relative to experiments 1 and 2, 
result in increases in returns to agricultural labor and decreases in returns to non-agricultural 
labor and capital relative to both preceding experiments. In fact, in experiment 3, agricultural 
labor wages decline very little relative to the base situation with no drought.   
  17 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the effects of alternative food aid distribution schemes for 
drought-response food aid to Mozambique. Alternative distribution schemes have very distinct 
impacts on household welfare and prices, notably the relative price of agricultural goods. 
Compared with monetization of food aid by government, direct distribution to households (done 
by population shares in the experiments) strongly benefits rural households for two reasons. First, 
when households take ownership of the food aid, they experience the first order impact of the 
resource transfer. Second, since households direct the large majority of any increment to income 
to the purchase of agricultural goods, the increase in household income generated by the food aid 
expands the demand for agricultural goods. Alternatively viewed, when households derive 
income from food aid, the desired components of nominal absorption shift towards agricultural 
products. As a result, agricultural terms of trade improve (even relative to the drought without 
food aid scenario), which further benefits rural households. Despite the maintained assumption 
that government cannot target food aid strictly at drought-stricken rural people, these results 
indicate that, when improving household welfare for the poorest is the primary goal of food aid, 
direct distribution of food aid to households is preferred. 
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Figure 1: Maize production and imports 
  
  24 
Table 1: Simulations and labels for subsequent tables. 
Base   Base 1995 Data 
Exp. 1 Drought without food aid 
Exp. 2 Drought with monetized food aid and revenue to government 
Exp. 3 Drought with food aid distributed directly to households 
 
  25 
Table 2: Declines in technology1 used to simulate drought. 
Grain 0.67  
Cassava 0.85  
Raw cashew 0.93  
Raw cotton 0.85  
Other exports 0.67  
Basic food crops 0.75  
Livestock 0.85  
Forestry 1.00  
 
1Technology declines are assumed to be Hicks-neutral. Since resource use is fixed in each sector, these 
technology changes translate directly into production declines. 
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Table 3: Components of real GDP and absorption (welfare). 
 
 
 
100 bn Mt1 
 
Percent deviation from base values 
 
 
 
Base 
 
Exp. 1 
 
Exp. 2 
 
Exp. 3 
Exports 32.7 4.4 0.2 1.6 
Imports 83.9 1.9 4.9 5.5 
Home Consumption 32.6 -16.1 -14.9 -13.7 
Marketed Consumption 106.8 -3.6 -3.0 -0.6 
Recurrent Govt. 16.8 0.6 10.5 2.4 
Non-Govt. Organizations 5.5 1.6 0.6 0.9 
Investment 61.5 0.7 3.2 0.5 
 
Real GDP 
 
172.1 
 
-5.0 
 
-4.9 
 
-4.9 
 
Absorption 
 
223.3 
 
-5.9 
 
-3.7 
 
-4.6 
 
1 The metical (Mt) is the local currency. The exchange rate was 8,890 Mt/US$ in 1995. 
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Table 4: Equivalent variation on consumption 
 
 
 
 
 
Percent of base consumption 
 
 
 
Base 
 
Exp. 1 
 
Exp. 2 
 
Exp. 3 
 
Urban 
 
0.0 
 
-4.3 
 
-3.4 
 
-2.6 
 
Rural 
 
0.0 
 
-9.8 
 
-9.2 
 
-5.7 
 
Total 
 
0.0 
 
-6.9 
 
-6.1 
 
-4.1 
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Table 5: Grain and food aid imports (in units of volume) 
 
 
 
Base 
 
Exp. 1 
 
Exp. 2 
 
Exp. 3 
 
Grain food aid volume 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
3.5 
 
3.5 
 
Volume of grain imports 
 
4.1 
 
6.0 
 
2.5 
 
2.8 
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Table 6: Agricultural terms of trade 
 
 
 
Index 
 
Percent deviation from base values 
 
 
 
Base 
 
Exp. 1 
 
Exp. 2 
 
Exp. 3 
 
Value added 
 
100.0 
 
31.6 
 
26.5 
 
35.6 
 
 
  30 
Table 7: Factor prices 
 
 
 
Index 
 
Percent deviation from base values 
 
 
 
Base 
 
Exp. 1 
 
Exp. 2 
 
Exp. 3 
 
Agricultural labor 
 
1.0 
 
-2.5 
 
-4.2 
 
-0.2 
 
Non-Agricultural labor 
 
1.0 
 
-7.3 
 
-4.9 
 
-7.9 
 
Capital 
 
1.0 
 
-9.2 
 
-8.3 
 
-9.8 
 
 
